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THE FLOATING LIEN AND THE PREFERENCE
CHALLENGE: SOME GUIDANCE FROM
THE ENGLISH FLOATING CHARGE
DAVID W. CARROLL*
I. INTRODUCTION
England has been wrestling with floating charge problems for
ninety-seven years, and this experience may be helpful in dealing
with the developing conflict between the U.S. Bankruptcy Act' and
the floating lien provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
English floating charge and the American floating lien have nearly
identical characteristics. Both security clauses may encompass all or
any part of the debtor's assets, including assets acquired after the
date the security is created. The collateral may be used as security
for past, present, and future advances by the creditor. The debtor
can pass good title to the encumbered assets to a bona fide purchaser
for value in the ordinary course of business prior to the commence-
ment of insolvency proceedings.
An examination of both the English and American treatment of
the problem makes it obvious that there can be no assurance that a
floating charge or lien will provide satisfactory collateral. In England,
the courts and Parliament have imposed so many restrictive prefer-
ence and priority rules that the floating charge has been substantially
emasculated. In the United States, there have not been enough author-
itative decisions to reach any conclusions as to the interaction of the
Bankruptcy Act and the Code. Articles on this subject vary greatly
in their suggestions and offer no real solution to the confused lender.'
The central issue in the Bankruptcy Act-Commercial Code con-
flict is whether the floating lien is prejudicial to the interests of unse-
cured creditors. At the time of bankruptcy, there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the floating lien creditor and the general creditor, but
it is submitted that this is not the proper time to recognize the existence
of a conflict. The appropriate time is the date of the creation and per-
fection of the floating lien. Most credit men are very pessimistic about
the position of the general creditor in bankruptcy and this pessimism
is supported by experience. Therefore, even assuming that a debtor
* B.S., Ohio State University, 1953; J1)., Ohio State University, 1954; presently
Senior Lecturer in Law, Institute of Administration, Zaria, Nigeria.
1 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. $1 1-1103 (1964).
2 See Comment, The Code in the Bankruptcy Courts: Some Significant Conflicts of
Policy, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 101 n.3 (1966), for a compilation of some of these
articles. It should be noted that although there are still no authoritative decisions, there
has been a referee's decision which has caused a great deal of concern. In re Portland
Newspaper Publishing Co., 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (4th ed.) 11 61722 (D. Ore. Feb. 9, 1966).
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was insolvent or in serious business difficulty, it would be reasonable to
believe that general creditors would not be opposed to allowing a float-
ing lien at least to the extent of any new funds given and legitimately
used by the debtor. It may even be argued that the general creditors
would be willing to consent to a floating lien for an amount in excess of
new value given, if the floating lien was part of a bona fide effort to
keep the business going and avoid bankruptcy.
No general creditor, however, would consent to a floating lien
designed to give a fraudulent preference to a creditor. For example,
let us assume a fairly common situation. The principal supplier of a
company burdened with a large unsecured account discovers that the
debtor company is hopelessly insolvent. In order to obtain security
and continue profitable operations, the supplier agrees to extend fur-
ther credit to the debtor upon receipt of adequate security, i.e., a
blanket floating lien. The principal supplier should not have to furnish
much additional capital to keep the debtor's business going beyond the
four-month preference period.' After that time has passed, the debtor
company is thrown into bankruptcy, and the principal supplier receives
payment for the bulk of his account from the realization of the col-
lateral. Similar situations can be manipulated by insiders of the in-
solvent company. These practices constitute blatant fraud. Regardless
of the four-month preference period, the lien should be held invalid,
and the lien creditor held personally liable to other secured and un-
secured creditors for damages resulting from his fraudulent continua-
tion of the business. It is submitted that recognition of this cause of
action as a part of the common law tort of fraud' would go a long
way toward properly solving the floating lien problem.
Moreover, the economic effect of floating liens must be carefully
evaluated in any rational determination of their validity. When a
debtor obtains a loan, this usually results in the creation of additional
credit. For example, laborers will work, tax liability will accrue, utili-
ties, services, and goods will be supplied, all as a result of the debtor's
apparent solvency. A large portion of this credit may be classified as
nonconsensual; that is, the extension of credit was not a conscious
extension of credit. No system of recording or notice will protect this
class of creditors, and it is at least arguable that this 'class of credi-
tors, which is in effect created or enlarged by the floating lien creditor,
is entitled to some protection. Obviously, additional credit is created
a The four-month preference period refers to the statutory provision that one of
the prerequisites for a creditor to achieve "preferred" status is that the transfer be
"made or suffered ... within four months before the filing by or against [the debtor]
. . of the petition initiating a proceeding [in bankruptcy] . . ." Bankruptcy Act §
60(a)(1), as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1) (1964).
4 See pp. 254-55 infra.
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by a secured loan, but it would appear that a floating lien would create
the greatest possible additional credit. It would create more credit
than a pledge, because the floating lien debtor would have both the
collateral and the loan to use in his business, whereas the pledge deb-
tor would have only the loan. A floating lien would create more credit
than a security interest in the nature of a chattel mortgage or similar
device because of the right of the floating lien debtor to freely dispose
of the collateral. Furthermore, the floating lien, while creating the
greatest credit, makes it most unlikely that the nonconsensual creditors
will be paid in the event of insolvency, because the floating lien credi-
tor will take all of the debtor's assets as collateral.
Certainty in commercial law is itself a virtue, and it is essential
that the problem of the validity of the floating lien be resolved. Pub-
lic policy, however, may well dictate the necessity of some definite
limitation on the scope of the floating lien.
II. THE AMERICAN FLOATING LIEN
A. The Bankruptcy Act
The most basic problem arising with respect to the floating lien
involves the preference provisions of Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act.5 The act provides that if the trustee in bankruptcy can carry
his burden of proof on the following elements, the preference is void-
able: (1) a transfer of the debtor's property; (2) to or for the ben-
efit of a creditor; (3) for an antecedent debt; (4) by an insolvent
debtor, the creditor having reasonable cause to believe the debtor is
insolvent; (5) within four months of bankruptcy; (6) having the result
of giving the creditor a greater percentage of his claim than another
creditor of his class.
The controversy over the validity of the floating lien focuses on
whether after-acquired collateral is given for an antecedent debt.
The Bankruptcy Act does not define antecedent debt, but it could be
argued that any collateral acquired more than twenty-one days after
creation of the lien can be considered to have been given for an ante-
cedent debt" If In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.' is not fol-
lowed by the federal courts, or if section 60 is amended to allow the
floating lien, then section 9-108 of the Code can be given effect and
the floating lien will survive the voidable preference provisions. In the
5 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1964).
o Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(7)(1), as amended, 64 Stat. 26 (1950), 11 U.S.C. §
96(a) (7) (1) (1964).
7 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (4th ed.) 11 61722 (D. Ore. Feb. 9, 1966). In this case, the
first to find the Code in conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act, the referee refused
to apply § 9-108 of the Code, and thus the floating lien in question was defeated by the
preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
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past, however, courts have favored an interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Act which provided the most equal distribution among creditors, even
if it was necessary to strain the proper literal meaning of the act.' So
far, there have not been any authoritative appellate court cases to re-
solve this problem, and only four recent decisions appear to bear any
relation to the subject." There were a number of pre-Code cases in
which liens containing after-acquired property clauses were upheld in
bankruptcy!" However, the floating lien provisions of the Code have
substantially diluted the applicability of these cases.
The Bankruptcy Act also sets forth a policy opposed to equitable
liens!' Section 9-204 of the Code, however, states that a floating lien
is not merely an equitable interest, because, as official comment 2 ex-
plains, the secured party is not required to take any further action,
"such as the taking of a supplemental agreement covering the new
collateral . . . ."
B. Uniform Commercial Code Provisions
The valid use of after-acquired property clauses and future ad-
vance clauses is made possible by three sections of the Code-9-108,
9-204, and 9-205. Section 9-108 provides that after-acquired property
taken in the ordinary course of business shall be deemed to be taken
for new value if new value was given when the lien was created. Fur-
thermore, under section 9-205 it is no longer necessary to police the
collateral in order to have a valid security interest!' There may, how-
ever, be some difficulty in bankruptcy if the assets are not policed. In
striking down section 9-108, the referee in Portland said that the
problem would have been avoided if the accounts in question had been
policed!' It is too early to predict whether this opinion will be ac-
cepted in the federal courts, but if it is, policing will again become the
most overrated detail of commercial law.
8 See, e.g., Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931); Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571
(2d Cir. 1954).
9 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., supra note 7; Howarth v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1962); In re Newkirk Mining Co., 1
U.C.C. Rep. 468 (ED. Pa. 1962); Erb v. Stoner, 19 Pa. D. & Cid 25 (1959).
to See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907); Matter of
Hayes, 140 F. Supp. 444 (D. Alaska 1956); In re Comet Textile Co., 15 F. Supp. 963
(S.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Alabama Braid Corp., 13 F. Supp. 336 (ND. Ala. 1935). But
see Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943). For further
discussion, see Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Prop-
erty Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 194 (1959).
11 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (6), as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (6)
(1964).
12 According to official comment 1, U.0
Benedict v. Ratner, 268 US. 353 (1925) ..
ments void as a matter of law because the
control over the collateral."
19 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing
.C. § 9-205 specifically "repeals the rule of
. and other cases which held such arrange-
debtor was given unfettered dominion or
Co., supra note 7, at 71136.
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Section 9-204 contains key provisions involved in the preference
problem. In order to have a security interest which will be recognized
in an insolvency proceeding, the security interest must be perfected,"
and before it can be perfected, it must "attach."" "A security interest
cannot attach until there is agreement ... that it attach and value is
given and the debtor has rights in the collateral."" This last require-
ment makes it appear that all collateral received after the lien is per-
fected becomes security for an antecedent debt. This requirement also
makes it difficult to argue that the collateral relates back to the date
the lien was created, or that the debtor was assigning an expectancy
in the collateral at the time of the original security agreement, or that
the collateral, although constantly changing, is really a single res.'
Section 9-108 provides:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an
obligation, releases a perfected security interest, or other-
wise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in
part by after-acquired property his security interest in the
after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new
value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor
acquires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary
course of his business or under a contract of purchase made
pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time
after new value is given.
This section was obviously drafted for the sole purpose of avoiding
the preference provisions of Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. If
section 9-108 were interpreted to mean that if any new value is given
initially, the entire floating lien will be upheld, it will conflict directly
with section 60(a) and the entire floating lien can be struck down."
If, however, it were interpreted to save security interests only to the
extent that new value was actually given at the time of creation and
thereafter, there could be no reasonable objection to the validity of
section 9-108.
III. THE ENGLISH FLOATING CHARGE
A. General Nature of the Floating Charge"
The first English case upholding a floating charge was decided
in 1870, 20 and, in the ninety-seven years since that decision, the En-
14 	§ 9-301.
15 U.C.C. § 9-303.
16 U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
17 See Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951).
18 See In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., supra note 7.
18 For a more complete discussion of the general nature of a floating charge, see
Gower, Modern Company Law 73-75, 389-93 (2d ed. 1957); Palmer, Company Law
399-405 (20th ed. 1959).
20 In re Panama, New Zealand & Australian Royal Mail Co., L.R. 5 Ch. 318 (1870).
247
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
glish courts and Parliament have considered many of the problems
which have now been raised in the United States by the Uniform
Commercial Code's floating lien. A floating charge is a security device
covering either all or a specific part of the property and assets of the
debtor both presently owned and thereafter acquired. The charge may
be given to secure past indebtedness, current loans, and future ad-
vances. All types of tangible and intangible personal property may
be validly included as collateral, although when real estate is made a
part of a floating charge, land registry laws must be complied with.
Thus, it can be seen that the floating charge is basically very much
like the American floating lien.
The floating charge, of course, constitutes a radical departure
from the possessory pledge and its progeny, which require specific
existing collateral and detailed description.' It is therefore not sur-
prising to discover that the floating charge was developed in equity.
In one case, Lord Macnaghten declared:
A floating security is an equitable charge on the assets
for the time being of a going concern. It attaches to the sub-
ject charged in the varying condition in which it happens to
be from time to time. It is of the essence of such a charge
that it remains dormant until the undertaking charged ceases
to be a going concern, or until the person in whose favour
the charge is created intervenes."
The historical source of the floating charge, and the dormant nature
of a floating security before it becomes fixed, may be extremely rele-
vant considerations in determining whether a floating lien would be
treated as an unattached equitable lien under the Bankruptcy Act.
There can be no doubt that a floating lien is dormant in the sense that
the debtor is free to deal with the collateral in the ordinary course of
his business until he defaults and the secured party takes action.
The English floating charge is available only to incorporated
companies' and farmers.' An individual debtor may not give a float-
ing charge on personal property, because personal property security
devices are controlled by the Bills of Sale Act which requires specific
description of collateral, thereby excluding any after-acquired prop-
erty clauses." However, the issuance of debentures by incorporated
companies is excepted from the Bills of Sale Act,' and the Agricul-
21 See, e.g., Bills of Sale Act, 1878, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31.
22 Government Stock & Other Sec. Inv. Co. v. Manila Ry., [1897] A.C. 81, 86.
23 Bills of Sale Act, 1878, Amendment Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, § 17.
24 Agricultural Credits Act 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 43, § 5.
26 Bills of Sale Act, 1878, Amendment Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, § 4. Compare
U.C.C. § 9-204(4) (b).
26 Bills of Sale Act, 1878, Amendment Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, § 17.
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tural Credits Act of 1928 provides that an agricultural charge shall be
effective notwithstanding anything in the Bills of Sale Act.' The justi-
fication for excepting debentures of incorporated companies from the
Bills of Sale Act has been based on the requirement that all deben-
tures be publicly registered." The exception for incorporated com-
panies is very strictly construed, and, therefore, associations incor-
porated under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 1893 are
not excluded from the Bills of Sale Act and may not create a valid
floating charge on their assets. 29 An industrial or provident society
may, however, be able to create a valid floating charge on its assets
other than personal property, although this does not seem a very im-
portant concession." It is therefore clear that the English floating
charge is available to a rather limited class of debtors. This limita-
tion may be in part due to the historical equitable development of the
charge, but it seems more reasonable to attribute the limitation to a
policy decision that floating charges should be restricted.
The English courts of equity have been very liberal in their rul-
ings regarding the detail required in the description of collateral in
order to create a valid floating charge. In the first floating charge case,
it was held that the word "undertaking" constituted a sufficient de-
scription.31 Subsequent cases supported the proposition that a very
general description of collateral was sufficient."
The floating charge must be registered with the registrar of com-
panies." This is a "lien" type of filing, requiring particulars of the
charge, together with the instrument creating the charge, rather than
the "notice" type of filing provided for by the Code." Furthermore,
the floating charge, if not registered within twenty-one days after
its creation, will be completely void and of no effect, even against a
subsequent charging creditor who has actual knowledge of the pre-
vious floating charge " The courts have been liberal in granting ex-
tensions of time to complete registration, but they will usually impose
the condition that the extension be without prejudice to rights acquired
prior to the time when the debentures are actually registered." This
27 Agricultural Credits Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 43, § 8(1).
28 In re Standard Mfg. Co., [1891] 1 Ch. 627; Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo.
6, c. 38.
29 Great No. Ry. v. Coal Co-operative Soc'y, [1896] 1 Ch. 187; Industrial and
Provident Societies Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 39.
so In re North Wales Produce & Supply Soc'y, Ltd., [1922] 2 Ch. 340.
31 In re Panama, New Zealand & Australian Royal Mail Co., supra note 20.
82 See, e.g., In re Colonial Trusts Corp., 15 Ch. 13. 465 (1880); In re Florence Land
& Pub. Works Co., 10 Ch. D. 530 (1879).
33 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 950).
31 	§ 9-402, Comment 2.
85 In re Monolithic Bldg. Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 643.
36 In re Joplin Brewery Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 79.
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proviso in an extension order apparently benefits only subsequent se-
cured creditors and not general creditors." However, if liquidation
takes place during the extension period and prior to registration, gen-
eral creditors will prevail, and holders of the unregistered floating
charge will not be treated as secured creditors." Registration of a float-
ing charge gives constructive notice of its existence, but not of restric-
tions on the creation of subsequent charges which may be contained in
the registered floating charge." Furthermore, actual knowledge of the
existence of the floating charge does not constitute notice of any re-
strictions on the creation of subsequent charges.'" It is, therefore,
obvious that the registration and notice provisions restrict and weaken
the efficacy of the floating charge, and thus further support the policy
of limiting the scope and effectiveness of floating charges.
B. Bankruptcy
In addition to the restrictions contained in the Bills of Sale Act,
a provision of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914 makes the floating
charge totally ineffective in the event of bankruptcy. Section 38 of the
English Bankruptcy Act provides, in part, that the property of the
bankrupt which is divisible among his creditors shall include:
(c) All goods being, at the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy, in the possession, order or disposition of the bank-
rupt, in his trade or business, by the consent and permission
of the true owner, under such circumstances that he is the
reputed owner thereof; provided that things in action other
than debts due or growing due to the bankrupt in the course
of his trade or business shall not be deemed goods within the
meaning of this section."
The reputed ownership requirement would, if not rendered inapplic-
able, eliminate the effectiveness of floating charges in all insolvency
situations.
The reason that the reputed ownership provisions of the English
Bankruptcy Act do not emasculate floating charges created by incor-
porated companies is that insolvent limited companies are not liqui-
dated pursuant to the act, but instead are subject to the winding up
provisions of the Companies Act." The respective rights of secured
and unsecured creditors in the winding up of an incorporated com-
37 In re Kris Cruisers Ltd., [1949] 1 Ch. 138.
38 In re Anglo-Oriental Carpet Mfg. Co., [1903] 1 Ch. 914; In re S. Abrahams &
Sons, [1902] 1 Ch. 695.
39 Wilson v. Kelland, [1910] 2 Ch. 306.
40 English & Scottish Mercantile Inv. Co. v. Brunton, [1892] 2 Q.B. 700.
41 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 38(c).
43 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 211-365.
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pany are controlled by the rules and laws of bankruptcy:" however,
it has been held that the reputed ownership rules of Section 38 of the
Bankruptcy Act do not apply to the winding up of a limited com-
pany."
The reputed ownership provisions do not apply to agricultural
floating charges by virtue of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1928,
which provides:
Farming stock subject to an agricultural charge shall
not, for the purposes of section thirty-eight of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 1914, be deemed to be goods in the possession,
order, or disposition of the farmer, in his trade or business,
by the consent and permission of the true owner thereof,
under such circumstances that he is the reputed owner there-
o f . 45
The purpose and drafting of the foregoing section are very similar to
that of Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The effective-
ness of the two sections, however, may well be quite different. The
subsection from the Agricultural Credits Act is a subsequent enact-
ment by the same legislative body that enacted the Bankruptcy Act,
and there can be no question that it would effectively modify the
Bankruptcy Act. On the other hand, section 9-108, enacted by state
legislatures, will probably have little effect on federal bankruptcy
law, especially in the light of the supremacy doctrine. Of course, this
problem could be resolved by a specific congressional action, either
affirming or rejecting the rule contained in section 9-108.
C. Preferences
The English bankruptcy rules and laws support the apparent
policy of restricting and limiting floating charges. Further evidence of
this policy of limitation can be found in the provisions relating to
preferences and priorities with respect to floating charges created by
incorporated companies. Section 322 of the Companies Act of 1948,
for example, limits the creation of floating charges and affords some
protection to the general creditor:
When a company is being wound up, a floating charge
on the undertaking or property of the company created with-
in twelve months of the commencement of the winding up
shall, unless it is proved that the company immediately after
the creation of the charge was solvent, be invalid, except to
43 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 317.
44 Gorringe v. Irwell India Rubber & Gutta Percha Works, 34 Ch. D. 128 (1887).
43 Agricultural Credits Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 43, § 8(4).
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the amount of any cash paid to the company at the time of
or subsequently to the creation of, and in consideration for,
the charge, together with interest on that amount at the rate
of five per cent per annum or such other rate as may for the
time being be prescribed by order of the Treasury. . . . 46
This section differs from Section 60(a) of the American Bankruptcy
Act in several respects. For one thing, the relevant period of time
preceding insolvency proceedings is one year in section 322 compared
to four months in section 60(a). It should be noted that the English
act originally provided for a period of three months prior to winding
up, later expanded to six months, and then, in 1948, extended to one
year.' The reason for the increases was obviously to combat the
fraudulent practice of creating the charge and then keeping the busi-
ness alive for the preference period. In addition, the English courts
define insolvency as the inability to pay one's debts as they become
due," rather than an excess of liabilities over assets. Furthermore,
the burden of proof on the solvency issue rests on different parties.
In England, the burden rests on the floating charge creditor to prove
the company solvent at the time the charge was created, whereas in
the United States the burden would rest on the trustee in bankruptcy
to prove insolvency at the time the preferential transfer occurred.
It should also be noted that in the United States a transfer is
either wholly void or wholly valid insofar as the preference section
is concerned. There is no provision like Section 322 of the English
Companies Act, which permits a court to find part of a floating charge
invalid as a preference, while at the same time upholding the charge
to the extent of new consideration actually given at the time of the
creation of the charge and thereafter. The same unitary approach is
taken by section 9-108 of the Code as is taken by the American Bank-
ruptcy Act. Section 9-108 provides that if any new value is given at
the time of the creation of the floating lien, then the lien shall be
treated as entirely valid and construed as though new value had been
given for any after-acquired property. The section does not limit the
validity of the lien on after-acquired property to the amount of the
new value given.
The result reached through Section 322 of the English Companies
Act seems infinitely superior to the results reached either by those who
advocate treating floating liens as preferences or by those who, by
virtue of section 9-108, would treat all floating liens as valid in toto
if any new value were given. The real purpose of the preference sec-
46 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, 322.
47 See Gower, op. cit. supra note 19, at 393.
48 In re Patrick & Lyon, Ltd., [1933] 1 Ch. 786.
252
FLOATING LIEN
lions is to prevent a creditor from improperly obtaining a secured
position, after insolvency, for an antecedent debt. There is justifiable
animosity among general creditors to insolvency proceedings, because
they rarely acquire much in bankruptcy.' If, however, the floating lien
is given effect, under the Bankruptcy Act, only to the extent of new
value actually given, the general creditors should have no legitimate
objection to this. On the other hand, the general creditors have a
perfectly valid objection to a system which favors a lien to the extent
it is given to secure antecedent indebtedness. It certainly seems reason-
able to assume that most general creditors would have given their
consent to a lien to the extent of new value advanced if they had been
asked at the time the lien was perfected, which seems to be the rele-
vant time for inquiry.
Since insiders and large creditors are in positions to effectuate
the continued operation of an insolvent company, the longer English
preference period of one year seems more desirable. Furthermore,
placing the burden of proof of solvency on the charging creditor seems
to conform more with reality and with the policy of the preference
provisions, which is certainly a desirable policy. While section 322
does not provide a complete answer to the problem, it is a step in the
right direction.
The exclusion from the English preference section of the amount
of any cash paid at the time of, or subsequent to, the creation of the
charge raises the familiar problems of when payment is in fact made
and when value is given. The English floating charge cases apply the
Rule in Clayton's Case, to wit, the doctrine of "first in, first out."'
Thus, if a creditor advances money against a floating charge to a
debtor who already owes the creditor money for an antecedent debt,
and the debtor then repays the creditor a portion of the total amount
owed, the antecedent debt would be the first repaid because of the doc-
trine of "first in, first out." This is so even if the subsequent advances
by the creditor did not equal or exceed payments made by the debtor.
In this situation, section 322 would be satisfied even though the basic
amount of the antecedent debt was constantly maintained because of
the subsequent advances. Although the "first in, first out" rule con-
forms with business practices, the application of the rule could be
abused, and should, therefore, be circumscribed by a requirement that
the floating charge be a legitimate transaction entered into in good
faith. Thus, in In re Yeovil Glove Co.,' the court properly applied the
"first in, first out" rule to a situation in which the creditor bank was
19 See Comment, supra note 2, at 112 n.71.
55 See, e.g., In re Yeovil Glove Co., [1965] 1 Ch. 148; In re Primrose (Builders)
Ltd., [1950] Ch. 561.
51 [1965] 1 a. 148.
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making legitimate advances to the debtor. However, the facts of the
case illustrate how a fraudulent charging creditor could avoid Section
322 of the Companies Act if there were not a good-faith limitation.
In Yeovil Glove, the creditor bank received £1,000 more in payments
from the debtor than it advanced after creation of the floating charge.
To reduce this to its simplest form, assume that an insolvent debtor
owes a creditor one hundred pounds prior to the creation of a floating
charge. When the floating charge is created, creditor pays debtor one
hundred pounds in cash, and debtor immediately pays creditor for the
antecedent debt. One well-reasoned English decision has indicated
that such a transaction would not constitute cash payment, because
the cash was not paid in good faith for the benefit of the debtor.'
The preference provisions, however, may not be sufficient to com-
bat all of the possible abusive and fraudulent uses of floating security
devices. It may be possible for an insider or major creditor to main-
tain company operations for a period longer than that provided in the
applicable preference section. This is especially true in the United
States where the preference period is only four months. In In re
Patrick & Lyon, Ltd.," the applicants sought a declaration that the
charging creditor, an insider, was personally liable for all of the debts
of the corporation on the theory that he fraudulently created floating
charges for the purpose of continuing the operation of an insolvent
business, to the detriment of the creditors. The fraud theory was based
in large part on provisions of the English Companies Act, 54
 and the
court ruled that actual fraud or intent to defraud had to be proven
in order to hold the defendant personally liable. Nevertheless, if all
the elements of fraud or misrepresentation could be shown in a case
in which a defendant improperly continued the operation of an in-
solvent business, or improperly and in bad faith created a floating
charge or floating lien, it would be perfectly reasonable to declare the
floating security invalid, no matter how long it had been in existence,
and hold the fraudulent creditor personally liable for the debts of
the insolvent debtor. Such a cause of action would serve as an excel-
52 In re Destone Fabrics, Ltd., [1941] 1 Ch. 319. But see In re Mathew Ellis, Ltd.,
[1933] 1 Ch. 458.
53 [1933] 1 Ch. 786.
54 Companies Act, 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 332(1) provides in part:
If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that any business
of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the
company or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, the
court, on the application of the official receiver, or the liquidator or any creditor
or contributory of the company, may, if it thinks proper so to do, declare that
any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in
the manner aforesaid shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of
liability, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the
court may direct.
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lent complement to a well-drafted preference provision, and would
constitute a real deterrent to the fraudulent use of floating charges
and floating liens. Thereafter, if an insider or major creditor of an
insolvent company created a floating security in order to secure his
antecedent debt, and then assisted or permitted the company to con-
tinue operations until the preference period was past (resulting in all
likelihood in the extension of substantial additional credit by the gen-
eral creditors) the floating security would be ruled invalid, and the
insider or major creditor held personally liable for the debts of the
insolvent firm. It would seem that this common law tort cause of
action would exist in the United States without any statutory enact-
ment. The recognition of such a cause of action would have a salutary
effect on the use of floating liens, and this, coupled with an amended
preference section, would provide adequate control of the floating
lien, which could then be upheld and given full validity for all its
legitimate business purposes.
D. Priorities
A study of the English priority rules relating to floating charges
is useful for purposes of comparison with the priority rules of the
Code,' and also to illustrate another example of the limitations that
the English place on floating charges.
In considering priorities on floating charges, it is important to
determine when the charge becomes fixed or "crystallized," because
it is crucial in answering the question of whether the claim competing
with the floating charge attached before or after crystallization. Or-
dinarily, no claim attaching after the floating charge has become fixed
can gain priority over the floating charge. Crystallization occurs, and
the floating charge ceases to float and becomes attached to specific
assets of the debtor company, when winding up proceedings are begun,
when the company stops doing business, or=when a receiver is ap-
pointed for the debtor company.'" Normally, winding up is the event
which fixes the floating charge." Mere demand for payment by the
charging creditor, or a notice sent to the debtor's bank, is not enough
to crystallize the floating charge."'
The floating charge, like the floating lien, permits the debtor
company to continue to operate its business in the usual way, using
the assets as though they were completely unencumbered. A purchaser
in the ordinary course of business takes the assets free and clear of
the floating charge. Thus the rules governing the rights of a good-faith
55 The Code's priority rules are in H 9-307, -308, -309, -310, -312.
50 Edward Nelson & Co. v. Faber & Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 367.
57 Wallace v. Universal Automatic Machs. Co., [1894] 2 Ch. 547.
68 Evans v. Rival. Granite Quarries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 979.
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purchaser for value in England and in the United States are very sim-
ilar."
By statutory enactment, certain taxes and wage claims are given
preferred status in winding up proceedings, and such claims, "so far
as the assets of the company available for payment of general credi-
tors are insufficient to meet them, have priority over the claims of
holders of debentures under any floating charge created by the com-
pany. . . ."" This statute expressly recognizes that there are at least
two classes of creditors whose interests and rights are in conflict with
holders of floating charges, and who should be given priority over the
charges." These creditors would not ordinarily examine registrations,
and they, together with other suppliers of goods and services, would
be induced to give more credit as a result of the funds furnished pur-
suant to the floating charge which permits continuation of the busi-
ness. It seems to be a perfectly legitimate approach to the floating
charge or floating lien problem, especially in light of the special char-
acteristics of such security devices, to determine if the rights of any
class of persons are being destroyed by the creation of the floating
security. Certain classes of creditors may be given priority as a mat-
ter of public policy. It would be desirable at least to consider whether
floating liens do in fact thwart the legitimate rights or expectations of
anyone.
Neither the "first to file" rule of priority," nor the "first to per-
fect" rule," is applicable in England when a conflict arises as to prior-
ity between a floating charge and a subsequent charge placed on the
assets of the debtor company. Ordinarily a subsequent specific charge
will take priority over a general floating charge. 64
 This is true even
though the subsequent creditor had knowledge of the existence of the
floating charge," and even though the debtor company is in default
in its payments on the loan secured by the general floating charge."
The basis for this rule of priority seems to be that the owner-debtor
has the right to use the assets as though they were unencumbered
prior to the time the floating charge becomes crystallized. In other
words, the right of the debtor to sell and absolutely dispose of his
assets in the ordinary course of business must include the lesser right
to use the assets as collateral in the ordinary course of business. It is
59 See U.C.C. 	 9-307.
60 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, 	 319(5)(6).
61 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, 1* 319(4), (5).
62	§ 9-312(5)(a).
63 U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(6).
64 English & Scottish Mercantile Inv. Co. v. Brunton, supra note 40; Wilson v.
Kelland, supra note 39.
65 In re Hamilton's Windsor Ironworks, 12 'Ch. D. 707 (1879).
66 Government Stock & Other Sec. Inv. Co. v. Manila Ry., supra note 22.
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even true that a subsequent specific floating charge will take priority
over a prior general floating charge." A prior general floating charge
does, of course, have priority over a subsequent general floating
charge."
Apparently, it is proper to insert in the instrument creating a
floating charge a provision restricting the debtor's right to impose
subsequent charges upon the assets. However, in order for the restric-
tion to be effective, the subsequent charging creditor must have actual
knowledge of the restriction. Although registration of a floating charge
gives subsequent creditors constructive notice of the existence of the
charge, registration does not constitute constructive notice of restric-
tions on subsequent charges contained in the registered instrument
creating the charge." Not even actual knowledge of the existence of
the floating charge will serve as sufficient notice of the existence of
restrictions. If the holder of a floating charge does not take possession
of the title deed, the holder of a subsequent specific charge who has
possession of the title deed will be given priority over the floating
charge, nothwithstanding the existence of restrictions." As a matter
of fact, in one case the bank which took the subsequent specific charge
and received possession of the title deeds knew of the floating charge
and had in its possession, on behalf of some of its customers, copies
of the debentures issued under the floating charge, containing restric-
tions on subsequent charges. Nevertheless, the court held that the
bank had priority over the prior floating charge." The mechanics and
rules relating to registration are also quite often relevant in priority
problems, and improper or delayed registration may completely elim-
inate all the priority rights of the floating charge.
Floating charges will also lose their priority to the following
types of creditors and situations: A garnishee takes priority over a
non-crystallized floating charge if the garnishment order is final and
the garnishee paid:" a distraint for rent levied prior to winding up
takes priority over a prior floating charge:" and the possessory lien of
a solicitor takes priority over a floating charge 44 A floating charge
will take priority over an execution creditor who has levied execution
prior to the commencement of the winding up proceedings," over ser-
vice of a garnishment order prior to appointment of a receiver in a wind-
67 In re Automatic Bottle Makers Ltd., [1926] 1 Ch. 412.
68 In re Benjamin Cope & Sons, [1914] 1 Ch. 800.
69 Wilson v. Reiland, supra note 39. •
70 In re Castell & Brown Ltd., [18981 1 Ch. 315.
71 In re Valletort Sanitary Steam Laundry Co., [1903] 2 Ch. 654.
72 Robson v. Smith, [1895] 2 Ch. 118.
73 In re Roundwood Colliery Co., [1897] 1 Ch. 373.
74 Brunton v. Electrical Eng'r Corp., [1892] 1 Ch. 434.
75 In re Standard Mfg. Co., [1891] 1 Ch. 627.
257
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ing up," and over a distress levied after a receiver was appointed."
A debtor whose debt is subject to a floating charge created by his
creditor may set off against the debt all claims which he has against
the creditor that arose prior to the time the floating charge became
crystallized." These English priority rules greatly restrict the effective-
ness of the floating charge and indicate further the English policy of
limiting such charges.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The following modifications in the American law relevant to
floating liens are recommended:
First. It seems very unlikely that section 9-108 will be given
effect in bankruptcy," and consequently, after-acquired property will
continue to be considered as given for an antecedent debt. This would
be unfortunate, because it is unnecessary that any decision go that far.
It would be much more reasonable to uphold section 9-108, but limit
the lien's validity to the amount of new value actually given at the
creation of the lien and thereafter. If this result cannot be achieved by
statutory interpretation, then section 9-108 should be amended ac-
cordingly.
Second. The best method of resolving the present uncertainty is
by federal legislation. This could be accomplished by amending the
preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act to do the following: (1)
extend the preference period from four months to one year; (2) place
the burden of proving the debtor's solvency on the lien creditor; and,
(3) uphold a floating lien to the extent of new value given at the time
of and after the creation of the lien, together with reasonable interest
on such amount.
Third. A cause of action should be recognized against a lien
creditor who fraudulently obtains a preferential security interest. This
lien creditor would be held personally liable for claims against the
insolvent debtor resulting from the creditor's fraud.
Fourth. Legislation should be enacted granting priority in bank-
ruptcy to tax claims and laborers' claims over the floating lien. Con-
sideration should also be given to the possibility that there may be
other classes of creditors who should have priority over floating liens.
76 Norton v. Yates, [1906] 1 K.B. 112.
77 In re Oak Pits Colliery Co., 21 Ch. D. 322 (1882).
78 Biggerstaff v. Rowatt's Wharf, Ltd.,. [1896] 2 Ch. 93.
79 See, e.g., In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (4th ed.)
61722 (D. Ore. Feb. 9, 1966); Comment, The Code in the Bankruptcy Courts: Some
Significant Conflicts of Policy, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 101 (1966).
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